As it was 20 years ago, constitutional reform is currently a subject of contentious debate in Argentina. And just like 20 years ago, the possibility of modifying the terms for presidential re-elections is at the centre of the issue.
Whilst there is a lot to be said on both sides on the issue of re-election, it is something that unfortunately tends to eclipse the wider and much needed debate on constitutional reform.

Supreme court Buenos Aires (Photo by Helena Andell)
The Argentine constitution was moulded on the US one, a model for liberal constitutions throughout the continent. It was drafted in 1853 and, despite going through a series of small changes, there has only been one major reform, in 1994. (Juan Domingo Perón reformed it radically in 1949, but his new constitution was abolished by the military government in 1957.)
In recent years, a number of Latin American countries – like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia – have reformed their constitutions. A cynical observer would put these revisions down to the wish of their presidents to be re-elected. However, the changes ran much deeper, seeking to adapt the legal system to a new social and political era.
The importance of a constitution that is coherent with the times cannot be underestimated. An example of something that deserves a second look in Argentina’s constitution is the country’s support of the Catholic cult – clearly incompatible with a secular state and a pluralist, increasingly secular society. Natural resource ownership has also been in the spotlight of late. Whilst the 1994 constitution gives each province control over natural resources within its territory, anti-mining activists are concerned that this has led provincial governments to carry out their own businesses with multinational mining companies, and demand a national policy to deal with the issue. Finally, Supreme Court judge Eugenio Zaffaroni has even proposed a bold move to a parliamentary system, re-opening an academic debate from the 1980s.
Constitutions are the principal law of the land, and as such there are mechanisms that keep them from being reformed too often; special parliamentary majorities, or in some cases referendums, are required for any alteration. However, it is also true that a certain degree of flexibility is needed. A rigid constitution is bound to eventually become obsolete and irrelevant.
Honduras provides an interesting example of this. Its constitution was passed in 1982, after ten years of military rule. In an attempt to avoid abuses of power, the writers of the constitution included permanent clauses against re-election. When President Manuel Zelaya decided to hold a non-binding referendum to ask Honduran citizens whether they approved of a change to the constitution in 2009, he was deposed, accused of attempting to include the possibility of re-election. Whilst those clauses might have made sense when they were written (leaving aside the fact that dictators often don’t care about those details), the conflict they caused by making the constitution so inflexible ended up unleashing a major institutional crisis.
The Re-Election Debate

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Photo courtesy of Presidencia de la República del Ecuador)
The possibility of indefinite re-election, or the need to limit a person’s term in power, is a recurring theme in some Latin American presidentialist systems. Often seen as simply an individual’s attempt to perpetuate themselves in power, the debate regarding re-election is a legitimate one, and should not be shut down due these assumptions.
Leaving personal intentions aside, there are philosophical arguments that can be put forward to justify the fairness of a system with indefinite re-election. It is often argued that liberal democracy is built upon the concept of ‘alternation in power’, but the key should be the possibility of alternation, not the alternation itself. This can be guaranteed more effectively by free and fair elections, as well as a democratic party system, than by banning re-election.
Some also argue that a limit on presidential terms effectively limits the people’s sovereignty, by restricting the choice of candidates.
However, the anti-re-election argument is also strong. Allowing one single person to concentrate so much power for so long can debilitate the chances of other leaderships emerging, affecting even the ‘possibility’ of alternation in power. It can lead to abuse, and weaken democratic institutions.
At the same time, the idea that Latin America’s caudillista tradition of historically-strong personal leaderships could be exacerbated by long periods in power is not always relevant to the re-election debate. Perón, the ultimate example of personal leadership in Argentina, was at the centre of political life for 30 years, 18 of which he spent outside of the country. He did not even need to be president to sustain his leadership, and showed that sometimes, institutional engineering becomes almost irrelevant against stronger political and social factors.
Unfortunately, some of the more common arguments against re-election are borderline racist. Many who can’t see a problem with the indefinite re-election of prime ministers in parliamentary systems, resulting in consecutive terms of over 11 years (Margaret Thatcher in the UK) or even a record 23 years (Tage Erlander in Sweden), just seem to think that Latin Americans are “not ready” for such responsibility.